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Husserl y Dufrenne sobre la temporalización del espacio pictórico
Abstract: Already with Husserl phenom-
enology seeks to address the many faces 
and manifestations of time, including the 
appearance of time in images. The critical 
question, however, is how such a mani-
festation is at all possible. In our paper we 
consider Husserl’s and Dufrenne’s answers 
to this question. It will be found that their 
positions not only have much in common, 
but they complement one another, with 
Husserl’s refi nements of the issue of image 
consciousness revealing still more ways of 
experiencing time in images. 
Keywords: Image, time, space, aesthetic.
Resumen: Ya con Husserl, la fenomeno-
logía busca estudiar las muchas facetas y 
manifestaciones del tiempo, incluyendo la 
apariencia del tiempo en las imágenes. La 
cuestión crítica, sin embargo, es cómo es 
posible tal manifestación. En este artículo 
se consideran las respuestas de Husserl y 
Dufrenne a esta cuestión. Se verá que sus 
posturas no solamente tienen mucho en 
común, sino que además se complemen-
tan, de modo que los refi namientos de Hus-
serl sobre la conciencia de la imagen reve-
lan todavía más modos de experimentar el 
tiempo en las imágenes.
Palabras clave: Imagen, tiempo, espacio, 
estética. 
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T o what do we owe that in the aesthetic contemplation of cer-tain images—such as portraits and sculptures, whether in a Classical or else (post-) Renaissance style, and in which a 
subject is represented—we do not fi nd ourselves countenanced by a 
presence from beyond time, but by an appearance that strikes us as 
still temporal somehow? Bernini’s David has not at all lessened the 
tension on his formidable sling since the last chiseling, yet seems 
ready to strike any minute. The wheels in Velázquez’s Las Hilan-
deras are spinning. Obviously these images do not move, and so they 
are properly distinguished from images such as those that become 
manifest in a zoetrope or even in a fl ipbook, by virtue of a succes-
sion of image-phases. Yet still we cannot shake off the impression 
that there is temporality involved not only in our aesthetic regard 
of images but also in the images thusly regarded.
It is well-known that phenomenology rises up to the challenge 
of accounting for this awareness of temporality in depictions, most 
famously perhaps in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind1 and in 
Mikel Dufrenne’s Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience.2 The same 
question reappears in the work of Roman Ingarden,3 and, unexpect-
edly perhaps, in the posthumously published works of the founder 
of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl.4 In what follows, I would 
like to address the question of the temporality of images in Husserl 
and Dufrenne, and highlight the surprising coherence and comple-
1. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Eye and Mind, in G. A. JOHNSON (ed.), The Merleau-Ponty 
Aesthetics Reader (Northwestern, Evanston, 1993) 121-149.
2. M. DUFRENNE, Phénomenologie de l’Expérience Esthétique Vol. I & 2 (PUF, Paris, 
1967); M. DUFRENNE, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (Northwestern, 
Evanston, 1973). Henceforth I shall cite Dufrenne’s French original as PE I ad 
PE II, and the English translation as PAE, followed by page number. 
3. See for example R. INGARDEN, The Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, 
The Picture, The Architectural Work, The Film (Ohio University, Athens [OH], 
1989) 217 passim. 
4. Especially in E. HUSSERL, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänome-
nologie der anschaulichen Vergengenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925), 
“Husserliana” 23 (Martinus Nijhof, The Hague, 1980); E. HUSSERL, Phantasy, 
Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925) Collected Works XI (Springer, 
Dordrecht, 2005). Henceforth I shall cite this text as Hua 23, followed by the 
Geman edition and the English edition page numbers. 
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mentarity between their approaches.5 Amongst others, I will show 
that one important reason why both thinkers can address the phe-
nomenon of image temporality is their sensitiveness to the ways in 
which a subject imaginatively participates in the manifestation of an 
aesthetic fi ction. To better gleam the latter point, I will fi rst canvas 
Husserl’s thoughts on image consciousness, drawing attention to 
parallels in Dufrenne, before turning to a more thematic compari-
son of their insights on image temporality. 
1. AESTHETIC AND DEPICTIVE IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HUSSERL
“All art is ‘aesthetic’; it is delight in what is seen in concreto.”6 
Husserl initiates a way of understanding the work of art that primar-
ily connects it to aesthetic experience as an intentional conscious-
ness.7 Intentionality names the very wonder that consciousness is 
consciousness “of” an object, and reveals the correlation between 
subjective acts of consciousness and the objectivity intended in 
them. Hence, rather than simply registering the presence of things, 
or else the mere arousal of feelings of pleasure or displeasure, in aes-
thetic consciousness we are intentionally directed to an objectivity, 
becoming particularly attentive to the very manner of its manifesta-
tion while sidelining other interests typical of the natural attitude. 
It is not surprising that in a now famous letter to the poet Hugo 
von Hofmannstahl in 1907, the father of phenomenology would 
compare the production and aesthetic reception of artworks to the 
acquisition of an intuition “enacted under a strict suspension of all 
5. While Dufrenne visited the Husserl Archives in Leuven, I have not found in-
dication in his text of having consulted the manuscripts that Eduard Marbach 
eventually edited and published as volume 23 of the Husserliana. My reason for 
comparing and contrasting Husserl and Dufrenne here is thus topical and will not 
suppose that Husserl’s infl uence on Dufrenne extended beyond the Husserlian 
texts published prior to 1953. 
6. Hua 23, 542/654.
7. See J. TAMINIAUX, Intersection between four Phenomenological Approaches to the Work 
of Art, “Fenomenología y Hermenéutica. Actas del I Congreso Internacional de 
Fenomenología y Hermenéutica” 1/1 (2008) 13, 29. 
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existential attitudes of the intellect and of the will” similar to the 
intuition of phenomena achieved within the phenomenological 
suspension’s neutrality modifi cation of the existential thesis of the 
world.8 And indeed, it would appear that the artist—like the poetic 
voice that marvels in Gerard Manley Hopkins’ “Pied Beauty”—
is far less interested in the use or worldly signifi cance of what it 
names—“[…] rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim”—and 
far more in its very appearance, which the poet’s eloquent verse 
declares beautiful.9 
Aesthetic experience is thus an intuitive consciousness, a way 
of becoming aware of an objectivity in its present manifestness. And 
yet, for Husserl, works of art are distinguished from other objects 
present within our perceptual fi eld of regard by their being imagistic 
or representational in character. In other words, works of art can-
not be simply and purely perceived as things, but our approach to 
them, however intuitive, must be also mediate and marked by the 
manifestation of things in their absence from the present. Thus, 
what Husserl calls image consciousness is “the essential foundation 
for the possibility of aesthetic feeling in fi ne art. Without an image, 
there is no fi ne art. And the image must be clearly set apart from 
reality.”10 All art is ‘imagistic’ or ‘representational’ for Husserl, and 
if we took ‘representation’ here quite broadly, not only Husserl but 
in fact most phenomenologists would agree.11 It is also true, how-
ever, that at least initially what Husserl understands by an image 
falls mainly along the lines of depictions, or images in which what he 
calls ‘pictorialization’ [Verbildlichung] takes place. Let us then turn 
to a more focused analysis of depictive image consciousness.
8. See E. HUSSERL, Husserl an von Hofmannsthal, in E. SCHUHMANN, K. SCHUH-
MANN (eds.), Edmund Husserl Briefwechsel Band VII (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2004) 
133-136. For an English translation (by S-O WALLENSTEIN) see E. HUSSERL, 
Letter to Hofmannsthal, “SITE” 26/27(2009) 1. 
9. G. M. HOPKINS, Pied Beauty, in M. FERGUSON ET AL. (eds.), The Norton Anthology 
of Poetry, 4th ed. (Norton, New York, 1996) 1063.
10. Hua 23, 41/44. 
11. See J. B. BROUGH, Representation, in H. R. SEPP, L. EMBREE, Handbook of Phenom-
enological Aesthetics (Springer, Dordrecht, 2010) 281-286. Here 281. 
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First of all, it is important to place image consciousness in the 
context of the general division of intuitive acts into a) acts of pre-
sentifi cation [Gegenwärtigung] which give the intended object as 
corporeally present before our regard, and b) acts of representifi ca-
tion [Vergegenwärtigung] which intend their objects as absent from 
the present.12 Perception [Wahrnehmung] is the only intentionality 
to rank under presentifi cation (=a), for it is indeed “originary con-
sciousness,” 13 while phantasy [Phantasie] and memory rank under 
the title of representifi cation (=b), and contrast with perception as 
modifi ed forms of consciousness. In this regard image consciousness 
too turns out to be a form of representifi cation, even if one that is in-
timately intertwined with perception. For although when we behold 
an image such as a photograph, it appears before our perceptual re-
gard amongst actually and corporeally present things, what appears 
photographed in it does not at all appear as corporeally present. The 
image thus represents something else not currently present, and in 
this representing Husserl fi nds a similarity with signs and symbols, 
as when an image (such as a thumbnail, or a hieroglyph) functions as 
an externally representative [äusserlich repräsentativ] for something 
else (for example, a blow-up of the same photograph). However, and 
unlike symbolic representations in general, an image may function 
in an internally representative [innerlich repräsentativ] manner, since 
the absent object intended by that image is effectively seen in the 
image (in the sense of hineinsehen)14. 
Both in texts published during his lifetime15 and in the post-
humously published literary estate Husserl will typically distin-
guish three objectivities involved in our dealings with images. On 
12. For presentifi cation see Hua 23, 309. N.B. I am using the translations for these 
terms suggested by Nicolas de Warren. See N. DE WARREN, Tamino’s Eyes, Pam-
ina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness Refashioned, in C. IERNA 
ET AL. (eds.), Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences (Springer, Dordrecht, 2010) 303-
332. 
13. See E. HUSSERL, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Tran-
scendental Logic (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2001) 40.
14. See Hua 23, 35/38 and 53/57.
15. For example, in E. HUSSERL, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological 
Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Hackett, Indian-
apolis, 2014) 216-217. 
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the one hand the physical image [physische Bild]—i.e., the photo-
graphic printed-paper, the chiseled marble rock, the painted can-
vas, the carved wood—awakens the mental image [geistige Bild] or 
image object [Bildobjekt], i.e., “the person or landscape appearing 
in the colors of the photograph, the white form appearing through 
the sculpture, and so on.”16 What appears, however, is the sub-
ject [das Sujet] of the image—“the landscape itself, which is not 
meant in these diminutive dimensions, not meant as colored in 
grayish-violent as the landscape in the photograph is, but in its 
actual colors, size, and so forth.”17 
One might be tempted by Husserl’s language here to consider 
the subject of the image to be the same as the object of percep-
tion. However, the image subject is a moment of the image.18 And 
although one identifi es real persons in photographs, one is not com-
mitted here to say that real life persons actually appear the way de-
picted persons appear in photographs.
From what has been said it becomes clear that it takes more 
than simple perception [Wahrnehmung] to encounter an image and 
become aware in it of something absent. Image consciousness in 
fact supposes a double or dual consciousness. Firstly, image-con-
sciousness comprises the perceptual [perzeptive] consciousness of 
the image object. In terms familiar from his earlier Logical Inves-
tigations, Husserl describes the awareness of an image as a distinct 
act of apprehension or interpretation [Auffassung] on a complex of 
sensations, and this apprehension differs from the case of perception 
since the appearing image is not some thing actually existing before 
our perceptual regard, but rather a perceptual nullity or “nothing” 
[ein Nichts]. As Husserl explains,
16. Hua 23, 29/30.
17. Ibidem. 
18. As Regina-Nino Mion asks “For how can a real life object ‘entwine’ with an 
appearing image or even ‘partially coincide with it’?”. See her excellent discus-
sion on the situation of the image subject vs. the corresponding thing in reality 
(particularly in photography-based arts) in R.-N. MION, Husserl and Cinemato-
graphic Depictive Images: The Confl ict between the Actor and the Character, “Studia 
Phænomenologica” 16 (2016) 269-293. Here 276.
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What actually exists there, apart from the ‘painting’ as a physi-
cal thing, the piece of canvas with its determinate distribution 
of color pigments, is a certain complex of sensations that the 
spectator contemplating the painting experiences in himself, as 
well as the apprehension and meaning [Meinung] that he bases 
on this complex so that the consciousness of an image occurs 
for him.19
Elsewhere Husserl describes the consciousness of an image object 
less in terms of an inner interpretation of a complex of sensations 
and more in terms of an externalization or projection of a phantasy 
which is sustained by a perceptual fi gment.
Something not present [ein Nichtgegenwärtiges] (something that 
in other circumstances would be intuitive and even be pre-
sented [vorstellig] in a reproduction or else in a perception) is 
pictorialized and rendered perceptible to the senses for me in 
the perceptual fi gment. The fi gment masks [verdeckt] from me 
the representifi ed (reproductive) presentation, coincides with 
it; what is representifi ed [das Vergegenwärtigende] slides into 
what is present [das Gegenwärtige], which in turns into what is 
exhibiting [Darstellenden].20 
Whether the consciousness of the image object originates in a pos-
iting perception (of, e.g., a printed paper) by gaining a new im-
aginative interpretation, or whether it originates in a phantasy that 
gains actually experienced sensuous contents, the perception of the 
physical image thing itself becomes ‘depleted’ or ‘empty,’ as its sen-
suous contents are simultaneously apprehended as an image object: 
“precisely as far as the design as a whole extends, we see, not paper, 
but plastic shapes.”21 
19. Hua 23, 22/23. Emphasis in the original.
20. Hua 23, 383-384/456. N.B., the translation slightly modifi ed.
21. Hua 23, 45/49.
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Moreover, the consciousness of the image object itself is not 
left self-standing. Secondly, then, image consciousness comprises an 
imaginative apprehension of the image subject in the image object. 
 
[T]he intuition of the image object awakens precisely a new 
consciousness, a presentation of a new object, which has an 
internal affi nity [innere Verwandtschaft ] with, a resemblance to, 
the image object as a whole and, as far as particular details are 
concerned, with respect to certain of its points.22 
The motivating bridge between these two moments of awareness 
(i.e., consciousness of the image object and consciousness of the 
subject) are the points of resemblance, or analogizing traits, through 
which “the subject looks at us, as it were.”23 But already from Hus-
serl’s own examples (involving black-and-white photographs) as 
well as our comments above regarding the disparity between the 
image subject and something perceived, it is clear that resemblance 
between these objectivities only goes so far. Thus, image conscious-
ness is marked by the awareness of confl ict and of nullity not only 
coming from the apprehension of an image as a fi gment or nullity 
within the perceptual fi eld of regard, but also from the realization 
that the image depicts its subject only to an imperfect degree. Hus-
serl’s description here would almost seem to play on the common 
refrain that two negatives make one positive. For even though image 
consciousness does not posit the existence of the subject within the 
framed space, the dual awareness of confl ict prevents images from 
being discarded the way the perceptual fi gments of illusory percep-
tions are discarded as contested. In contrast to a perceptual fi gment, 
an image, by being doubly (and simultaneously) contested, is not a 
contender for a positing perception, and never announces itself as 
bringing to appearance something present. In one remarkable pas-
sage, Husserl understands this dual confl ict in temporal categories, 
effectively signaling an “image time:” 
22. Hua 23, 31/32.
23. Hua 23, 30/31-32.
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So we have appearance here, sensuous intuition and objecti-
fi cation, but in confl ict with an experienced present. We have 
the appearance of a not now in the now. “In the now,” insofar 
as the image object appears in the midst of perceptual reality 
and claims, as it were, to have objective reality in its midst. “In 
the now” also insofar as the image-apprehending is something 
temporally now. Yet on the other hand a “not now” insofar as 
the confl ict makes the image object into a nullity that does in-
deed appear but is nothing […].24
 
We will turn to this very question of the “not now” in image mo-
mentarily. First, however, we need to address a development in 
Husserl’s understanding of image consciousness that puts him in the 
vicinity of Mikel Dufrenne’s understanding of aesthetic experience. 
2. NON-DEPICTIVE IMAGE CONSCIOUSNESS 
IN HUSSERL AND DUFRENNE
“Earlier I believed that it belonged to the essence of fi ne art 
to present in an image, and I understood this presenting to be 
depicting [Abbilden]. Looked at more closely, however, this is 
not correct.”25
From out of an understanding of art as imagistic and depictive, 
Husserl goes on to signal (in a text ca. 1918) that no matter how 
imagistic, art is not for that matter generally or exclusively con-
cerned with depictions. He begins to grapple this point particu-
larly in connection to the theater. At a theatrical presentation, the 
appearance of an actor in disguise would not strike one as resem-
bling or analogizing to a degree a person of the drama. Neither 
would one necessarily think of the actor as simply a trigger for cer-
tain complexes of sensations to emerge within the viewer’s fi eld of 
regard to be apprehended as an image. The actor is certainly pre-
24. Hua 23, 47-48/51. Emphases in the original. 
25. Hua 23, 514/616.
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sent before his public, but however in plain sight, he is “concealed” 
both by his own bodily imagination of himself as the character as 
well as by the viewer perceptually imagining the character in him. 
What phantasy as “perceptual phantasy” [perzeptive Phantasie] or 
as “immediate imagination” [unmittelbare Imagination] here does 
is to habilitate both the actor and the viewer to take his acting—
already presented by a perception—as enacting a fi ctive character 
and situation. 
It will be noted that by taking into the imaginary entire, ac-
tually perceived objectivities rather than complexes of sensation, 
perceptual phantasy does not distinguish between three objectivi-
ties—physical image, image object, and image subject—but only 
two: what is actually perceived, on the one hand, and on the other 
hand what is taken as fi ctive. In other words, instead of producing 
an intuition in the manner of depiction of an absent subject, what 
image consciousness as non-depictive perceptual phantasy here does 
is to take what is already perceptually and intuitively available into a 
neutrality modifi cation as fi ctive.26 However startling at fi rst, Hus-
serl is entirely right to declare that aesthetic phantasy operates not 
only on the level of producing intuitions of absent subjects on the 
basis of complex of sensations, but also on a non-intuitive level27 
by merely bringing about a neutrality modifi cation of the thetic or 
belief component of perceptions which already display fully con-
stituted objects within the perceptual fi eld of regard. It is by virtue 
of such a non-intuitive phantasy act that, as revelers and onlookers, 
26. Rudolf Bernet has explained Husserlian depictive phantasy’s neutrality modifi ca-
tion as follows: “In perceptual phantasy, the modifi cation of neutrality is applied 
to a perceptual consciousness, which is to say, an act of perception impressionally 
experienced by internal consciousness. In this way, the aesthetic perception of 
the irreal image-object of a painting is accompanied by a neutralization of the 
material existence of the traits and the colors that I actually perceive on the can-
vas of the painting”. R. BERNET, Consciousness of the Absent and the Fictitious, in 
Proceedings of the Husserl Circle at University College Dublin (Humanities Institute 
of Ireland, Dublin, 2005) 139-152, here 143-144.
27. Cf. Hua 23, 514/616: “Art is the realm of phantasy that has been given form, of 
perceptual or reproductive phantasy that has been given form, of intuitive phan-
tasy, but also, in part, of nonintuitive [unanschaulicher] phantasy. It cannot be said 
that art must necessarily move within the sphere of intuitiveness.”
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we see things and persons on display as pure show [Schein] without 
believing or else disbelieving in what appears. 
Naturally it goes without saying that the performance of this 
modifi cation and the inauguration of a perceptual phantasy must 
necessarily follow certain cultural clues geared towards guiding the 
spectator towards performing this particular suspension.28 As Hus-
serl explains, 
‘Experience’ [Erfahrung] teaches […] [that] certain things show 
themselves to be suited to excite a double apperception; […] 
Their perceptual appearances, or those belonging to certain 
circumstances favorable in this respect, easily change into 
other perceptual modes of appearance, and do so in such a 
way that the stock of what is genuinely perceived is common, 
or almost entirely common, to both perceptions entering into 
the confl ict-unity while the stock of what is not genuinely per-
ceived (of what is co-perceived) on both sides is the ground 
for the confl ict-relationship. And these things are then offered 
under such circumstances to perception or to the perceptual 
consciousness of confl ict, and are supposed to cause us, in shift-
ing to a mere phantasy, to place ourselves on the ground of the 
cancelled perception, hence to inaugurate a purely perceptual 
phantasy.29
Thus the aesthetic contemplation of artworks requires a non-in-
tuitive use of phantasy in relation to perception, for three reasons. 
Firstly, it is by a particular accomplishment of perceptual phantasy’s 
neutrality modifi cation that I take actual things offered in percep-
tion as fi ctive, and this neutrality modifi cation is prompted by cul-
tural knowledge of, e.g., the point of theatrical representation. I see 
28. Cf. Hua 23 516/618: “In the case of a theatrical presentation, the play –this sec-
tion of an illusory world– appears, but we do not begin with a normal perception. 
We do not begin with the thesis of the reality of what appears perceptually. On 
the other hand, confl ict exists here too, only confl ict that is there from the begin-
ning […] We know that what is happening here is play acting.”
29. Hua 23, 517-518/619.
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the actor on stage, and I am ready to take him as the person of the 
drama, not because he “looks like” this person to a limited degree, 
but because I already grasp his imaginative pretense. Second, it is 
by phantasy that I keep as distinct and incommensurable the world 
of perception and the world of fi ction. Behind the King’s room on 
stage there is no castle to be perceived, but by a non-intuitive phan-
tasy (one that does not have to intuitively render the unseen sides of 
this fi ctive, staged world) I extend that world of fi ction while being 
aware of its confl ict with the actual, real world. Thirdly, I do not 
act upon that awareness of confl ict because by participating in the 
show (as onlooker) I effectively displace myself into the enacted 
world of fi ction.30 
How this new understanding of art as moving within the sphere 
of non-intuitiveness and non-depictability impacts concretely other 
visual fi ne arts, particularly painting, is a matter that Husserl did not 
elaborate as thoroughly.31 Perhaps only in the following comment 
(either from 1916 or from 1918) Husserl returns to this issue.
 
All art moves between two extremes. A) Image art: presenting 
in an image, depicting, mediating through image conscious-
ness. B) Art that is purely a matter of phantasy, producing 
phantasy formations in the modifi cation of pure neutrality. At 
least producing no concrete depictive image. The ‘once upon 
a time’ is still related to the actual now and the world, and 
confl ict with it can indicate an imagery that nevertheless does 
not constitute a visible image object. Music. Playful Phantasy.32
 
However, more than simply reading here a Husserlian gesture to-
wards non-fi gurative or abstract art, or else to idealistic fi gurative 
30. For more on Husserl’s understanding of imaginative displacement [Versetzung] 
see R. SOKOLOWSKI, Displacement and Identity in Husserl’s Phenomenology, in S. IJS-
SELING (ed.), Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990) 
173-184. 
31. For a more detailed examination of how Husserl approached concrete works of 
painting, see D. THIEL, Der Phänomenologe in der Galerie. Husserl und die Malerei, 
in Axiomathes 9/1-2 (1998) 35-47. 
32. Hua 23, 540/651.
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art,33 we should consider the possibility that by virtue of perceptual 
phantasy’s neutrality modifi cation other perceptually available ele-
ments of the painting as a physical image thing—such as the tex-
ture of the paint brush stroke—are ‘taken up’ as playing a role in 
the image. Normally in depictive image consciousness the physical 
image thing is neutralized for the sake of harvesting the correspond-
ing complexes of sensations. However, in regarding Rembrandt’s 
The Jewish Bride I am invited to take the bright texture of the brush-
strokes not only as a vehicle for bringing to intuition the image of 
the lover’s embrace of his bride; but also, as the very texture of that 
powerful embrace. 
It is at this point that we turn to Mikel Dufrenne—notwith-
standing his explicit caveat that in taking up the phenomenological 
method he is not following Husserlian phenomenology as much 
as Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s versions of the phenomenologi-
cal endeavor34—because of how remarkably close his analyses can 
seem in relation to the foregoing Husserlian account of perceptual 
phantasy.35 
In typical phenomenological fashion, Dufrenne affi rms the 
intentional correlation and interdependence between the aesthetic 
object and the aesthetic experience while specifying (in ways that 
are coherent with Husserlian doctrine) the difference between the 
work of art (as approached outside aesthetic consciousness) and the 
aesthetic object.36 Moreover, Dufrenne emphasizes the reciprocity 
and complementarity between these two poles of aesthetic experi-
ence—the conscious subject and his performances, on the one hand, 
and the work of art which seeks to become an aesthetic object. Fur-
33. Of which he goes on to speak on Hua 23, 541-542/653-654.
34. “It will be seen that we are striving to follow Husserl to the letter. We understand 
phenomenology in the sense in which Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have acclimated 
this term in France: a description which aims at an essence, itself defi ned as a 
meaning immanent in the phenomenon and given with it” (PAE xlviii/PEA I 4-5).
35. As E. S. CASEY puts it, “Dufrenne is faithful to his origins in Edmund Husserl 
[…].” See his Mikel Dufrenne (1910-1995), in H. R. SEPP, L. EMBREE (eds.), 
Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics (Springer, Dordrecht, 2010) 81-84. Here 
81. 
36. Ibidem. 
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thermore, Dufrenne calls this aesthetic awareness a perception.37 But, 
as we will see in a moment, this perception, however entangled with 
the sensible, does not exclude a deep, imaginative involvement on 
the one hand, and on the other hand an awareness of “the empiri-
cal conditions of aesthetic experience” embedded in the cultural 
world.38 
Fairly early on in his Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience Du-
frenne gives us a telling example—a visit to a performance of Wag-
ner’s Tristan and Isolde—to develop the fi ne points of the relation 
between the work of art and the aesthetic object. Underlying the 
aesthetic object are all the elements pertaining to the production 
of the opera, including the spectators—“for it is no more irrelevant 
[for the aesthetic perception] that thousands of gazes converge and 
that a human intercommunication is knit in silence.”39 He goes on 
to describe the appearance on stage of the actress: “Kirsten Flagstad, 
who has such splendid air of health, is not Isolde, the frail Isolde 
who is dying of love. Small matter, for what counts is her voice, 
which must be and is the voice of Isolde […] [for] the opera singer is 
neutralized, perceived only in her role, not as herself.”40 Like Hus-
serl, Dufrenne insists on the voluntary and informed character of 
the spectator’s neutrality as the manner in which we distinguish the 
real world from the world of fi ction: 
I indeed relate to Tristan and Isolde through the singers, 
but not as a dupe. I do not call the doctor when I see Tristan 
stretched out on his couch, and I am fully aware that he is a 
legendary being who is as mythical as a centaur. Besides, mar-
ginal perceptions keep reminding me that I am at the theater as 
a spectator. Thus Tristan and Isolde are, as Husserl says of the 
Knight and Death in Dürer’s engraving, “merely depicted,” 
constituting a mere portrait.41 
37. PAE lii/ PEA I 9-10.
38. PAE liii/PEA I 11. 
39. PAE 7/PEA I 36.
40. PAE 7-8/PEA I 36-37.
41. PAE 9/PEA I 38.
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We now know (in light of posthumous writings) that Husserl would 
not necessarily agree with this understanding of performance arts as 
merely depictive. But both thinkers would of course agree that a phan-
tasy modifi cation of positing perception is at work in the spectator. 
However, a more relevant matter for discussion here is Du-
frenne’s suggestion that phantasy’s neutrality modifi cation does not 
only originate in the spectator. For Dufrenne, in attending to the 
performance, it also feels “as if the neutralization were proceed-
ing not from me but from the objects themselves.”42 Husserl could 
agree with this statement—but only as far as dramatic representa-
tion is concerned, because the actors themselves do perform a per-
ceptual phantasy, a modifi cation that is apparent to them as actors—
even if this modifi cation is not as apparent at fi rst to unexperienced 
spectators of the drama.43 In addition, Dufrenne describes the belief 
neutralization situation of what Husserl termed perceptual phantasy 
as follows: 
Nearly everything happens as if, during the play, the real and 
the unreal were balancing one another […] I do not posit the 
real as real because there is also the unreal which the real des-
ignates [désigne]; I do not posit the unreal as unreal, because 
there is also the real which promotes and supports this unreal.44
Husserl would also seem to be in agreement that for the informed 
theater goer a sort of balance is struck between the real and the 
unreal without mutual cancellation. In a passage to which we have 
alluded earlier, Husserl has the following to say: 
42. PAE 10/PEA I 39.
43. In “La Busca de Averröes” Jorge Luis Borges describes how a theatrical 
representation might have appeared to a traveller coming from a culture lacking 
a dramatic tradition and thus lacking the aforementioned empirical clues for 
perceptual phantasy. In his recount of the theater –which, apart from the dramatic 
use of imagination, truly appears to unacquainted spectators as a borderline 
madhouse– the traveller says “They were not mad […] They were fi guring, one 
merchant told me, a story.” J. L. BORGES, La Busca de Averröes, in Obras Completas, 
vol. 1 (Planeta, Bogotá, 2007) 700-707. Here 704. (Translation from the author). 
44. Ibidem. 
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But we (who are not children) do not carry out any cancellation 
understood as active negation, any more than we actively carry 
out the consciousness of reality belonging to actual experience 
in which the actors and “presenting” things are given to us as 
actual […] And we must also note that we do not alternate intu-
itively between reality and illusion […]. Rather, without alter-
nating, we have from the beginning only the artistic “image”; 
and what is real that functions as presentation, what is actually 
experienced without modifi cation is continuously concealed 
[verdeckt]—concealed, though there is consciousness of it, only 
consciousness of it nonintuitively and in the peculiar fashion 
that the word “concealment” suggests in this case.45 
One should immediately notice as a point of contrast that what Du-
frenne calls a “designation” of the unreal by the real is for Husserl 
not quite the work of a symbolic consciousness (even if nonintui-
tive) but of a nonintuitive imaginative consciousness that “conceals” 
the real under the imaginary—even if the actor is never quite fully 
concealed.
To return to Dufrenne’s argument, the real and the unreal 
do not constitute the aesthetic object properly speaking, but in the 
case of the opera they are themselves in service of the song, which 
for Dufrenne is the primary aesthetic object of the opera. While all 
other elements of the production are present and necessary for the 
work of art to emerge, the aesthetic object reduces ultimately to 
the sensible or perceptible element—more precisely the manner in 
which the sensuous or perceptible element communicates the work 
in a living presence. 
To conclude this section, it seems that Dufrenne agrees and 
complements in the main Husserl’s assertions regarding art as seek-
ing to convey an intuition within a neutrality suspension. Dufrenne 
would also concede that art is imagistic, if by this is understood that 
the manifestation of the arts call for an imaginative involvement 
in perception. Moreover, it appears that for both Husserl and Du-
45. Hua 23, 518/618.
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frenne the aesthetic contemplation of a work is not limited simply 
to enacting a show, but also has to do with becoming attentive to 
the very sensuous (or intuitive) manner in which the show comes to 
manifestation. 
Having seen the interrelation between aesthetic consciousness 
and the manifestation of the aesthetic object in an aesthetic percep-
tion involving perception and phantasy, let us now compare and 
contrast Husserl and Dufrenne on the temporality of images. 
3. THE TEMPORALIZATION OF PICTORIAL SPACE 
IN HUSSERL AND DUFRENNE
“Rest or change appears in the image. In the ordinary resting 
image, which depicts by means of an unchanging image object, 
a movement might appear—a rider galloping away in a paint-
ing […]”46
To what do we owe that a static image might exhibit for us not just 
a subject at a moment of time but also a movement? Answering 
this question meaningfully requires that we distance ourselves from 
the standard thesis (dating as far back as Lessing’s Laocöon)47 that a 
static image—such as a painting or a sculpture—can only exhibit 
one moment of time, and therefore, for aesthetic purposes, it ought 
to exhibit the most telling moment of an event to signify it. And it 
would seem that Husserl has good reasons to distance himself from 
this position, given his originary contention of a perception as an 
awareness of an “extended present” as opposed to the awareness of 
an isolated and abstract “now-point.” 
Even though Husserl does not come to mind as a phenom-
enologist delving deeply into the aesthetics of static image tempo-
rality, it is important to note that for a time he earnestly asked how 
an image could convey a time—the reason being that he thought (at 
46. Hua 23, 489/584.
47. See G. LESSING, Laocöon, in H. ADAMS (ed.), Critical Theory since Plato (Harcourt, 
New York, 1971) 349. 
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least initially) that there was something imagistic to our awareness 
of the past. 
The painting furnishes a perceptual presentation, but what 
is now is the representant of something that is not now. Of 
course, not every painting represents a time [eine Zeit], but 
think of paintings of historical events: the execution of Charles 
II, the storming of the Bastille, and the like. Yet these are not 
memories.48 
In this reference, the “not now” in image is understood as a tempo-
ral now, just like in the passage about the “image now” with which 
we closed our fi rst section supra. However, both Husserl’s under-
standing of time-consciousness and of image time undergoes impor-
tant development. Let us address each briefl y in turn. 
Firstly, in the course lectures that were eventually edited as On 
the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Husserl con-
nects time and time-awareness. The time which comes under the 
purview of a description of consciousness is not, however, real or 
transcendent time, but the time of appearing, the immanent time 
which “cannot be measured; there is no clock and no other chronometer 
for it. Here one can only say: now, before, and further before, changing 
or not changing in the duration, etc.”49 Moreover, Husserl real-
izes that time-consciousness, rather than piecing an awareness of 
elapsed phases and now-phases of consciousness, is always already 
of an intentional threefold character. We are aware of an object as 
present because we experience it (a) in one of its phases as ‘now,’ 
(b) in one or more of its phases as ‘just-having-been now,’ and (c) 
still in other forthcoming phases as ‘not-yet-now.’ So consciousness 
always already manifests a temporal structuring: we are internally 
and originally aware of the ‘now phase’ in “primordial impression 
48. E. HUSSERL, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-
1917) (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1991); E. HUSSERL, Zur Phänomenlogie des inneren 
Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917)(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966). Henceforth 
Hua 10 followed by the German and English page numbers. Here 184/190. 
49. Hua 10, 339/351.
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or primordial sensation;” of the elapsed phases, in “retentions,” and 
of the forthcoming phases in “protentions.”Accordingly, Husserl 
insists that the term “now” is not a name for a part of a temporal 
object, or even for an objective phase, but rather, the term “now” 
names the mode of appearance of an objective phase. Furthermore, 
the “now” is a relative concept, as it refers to a “past.”50 For the 
“now” is the source of new time-points in a temporal continuum 
running off.51 
Secondly, this necessity to consider a temporal extendedness 
already on the basis of the representation of a now phase would 
cohere with Husserl’s suggestion that there can be an “adequate de-
piction” of an event and not just of a thing, such as a painted leap or 
a painted run.52 John Brough has ably incorporated this Husserlian 
endeavor to account for this Husserlian insight as follows:
 
We do not consider it at all odd if an art critic writes that a 
painter has captured a ‘fl eeting instant.’ We do not consider it 
odd because we see a fl eeting instant in the image-object that 
appears to us when we look at the painting. We may not see a 
succession of moments or events, but we do see a single moment. 
And it appears as a moment only insofar as it appears to us as 
part of a temporal context, a temporal succession. If one says 
that it appears to us as a depicted now-moment, then, in com-
mon with every now, it appears with a halo of past and future. 
It cannot be snatched cleanly from its context with all of its 
temporal references scrubbed away.53
50. Hua 10, 68/70.
51. For two more extended (and lucid!) introductory presentations of Husserl’s doc-
trine of time-consciousness, please see J. BROUGH, The Emergence of an Absolute 
Consciousness in Husserl’s Early Writings on Time-Consciousness, “Man and World” 
5/3 (1972) 298-326 and J. BROUGH, Husserl’s Phenomenology of Time Consciousness, 
in J. MOHANTY, W. R. MCKENNA (eds.), Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook (Uni-
versity Press of America, Washington, 1989) 249-289 
52. Hua 23, 493/587-588.
53. J. BROUGH, Plastic Time: Time and the Visual Arts, in J. BROUGH, L. EMBREE (eds.), 
The Many Faces of Time (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2000) 223-244. Here 236.
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Husserl, however, is brought to hesitation (saying “This is some-
thing to ponder”54) when he refers the phenomenon back to the 
threefold distinction between image thing, image object, and image 
subject. “Is this the perception of a leap serving as an image for a 
leap?”55 Hardly, because 
the modes of givenness, the modes of appearance [of both the 
image object and the image subject] are fi rmly shut off, no 
matter how they may run over into continuations by means of 
phantasy: as when I allow myself to be drawn into the phanta-
sying of the running […] The runner belongs to another time 
and to another space […] but the phase of time to which he 
belongs is ‘presented’ as detached and does not abide in time, 
and is not a really enduring phase.56 
Is it possible that these continuations into, e.g., memory or phan-
tasy, however external to the static image, are not inessential for a 
rapprochement between images and time? For the subject appearing 
in image may ‘bring to mind’ recollections or phantasies that are en-
tirely appropriate to is “as when, on seeing the pictures of Paolo Ve-
ronese, we feel transplanted into the magnifi cent, opulent life and 
activitiy of the grand Venetians of the sixteen century.”57 Is not this 
the way in which we suspect time on the side of images? For how 
else could something purely non-temporal, a purely non-temporal 
phase, engage us to imagine something temporal even in it?
It is at this point that I would like to pass this question to Du-
frenne, whose rich treatment of the temporalization of pictorial 
space is infl uenced not so much by Husserlian time-consciousness as 
by the Kantian thesis of temporality and spatiality as pure forms of 
sensible intuition (and of time as the form of inner sense).58 Clearly 
the reason behind Dufrenne’s strategy is to affi rm a certain solidar-
54. Hua 23, 493/588.
55. Ibidem.
56. Hua 23, 537/646.
57. Hua 23, 37/40.
58. Cf. M. Dufrenne, PAE 242ff./PEA I 306ff.
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ity between space and time, such that, e.g., music—the temporal art 
par excellence is found to be spatial, and painting, the purely spatial 
art, cannot be thought out suffi ciently without reference to time. 
In order to make this thesis clearer, Dufrenne challenges the 
primacy of representation in painting. For “even though it is pri-
marily fi gurative, [painting] involves a treatment of the sensuous 
which is not solely ordered by a concern for representation.”59 
Within his analysis, Dufrenne distinguishes between the pictorial 
object and the represented object—roughly analogous to the pre-
viously seen Husserlian distinction between the image object and 
the image subject—and claims that when the represented object 
holds the viewer’s entire attention at the expense of the awareness 
of the pictorial object “then the temporal dimension of painting 
cannot appear.”60 Here it is important to observe that Husserl 
would only partly agree with Dufrenne’s statement. Even after 
considering the point that both the static image and the image 
subject are “ideal objectivities” not changing in a temporal dura-
tion, Husserl would still say that the manifestation of an image 
space comes hand in hand with an awareness of an image time. 
However, Husserl, as much as Dufrenne, would also admit that 
the development of this image temporality would require a playful 
imaginative engagement that is ready to entertain more than what 
the image simply and patently offers in its depictive function. 
Accordingly, Dufrenne sidelines a) the level of temporality 
pertaining to the represented (image) subject, famously stating 
that “Van Gogh’s olive trees, desperately twisted in the soil by 
their convulsive roots, are more actively in motion than Geri-
cault’s horses.”61 Likewise, b) the ‘objetive time’ belonging to the 
physical image thing, while not irrelevant, nevertheless does not 
cut to the heart of the experiential temporality of images. More 
important still is the c) time involved in seeing the painting: for “it 
is by this movement that the movement of the object appears.”62 
59. PAE 241/PEA I 305.
60. PAE 274/PEA I 345.
61. PAE 279/PEA I 351.
62. PAE 278/PEA I 349.
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And yet, Dufrenne admits, “this quasi-imperceptible and unregu-
lated movement hardly awakens in us the feeling of duration […] 
The pictorial object becomes animated only by affecting us more 
deeply than this.”63 
The remaining source of temporality in the image, therefore, 
is this d) internal duration belonging to the picture. There are, 
however, further specifi cations of the sources and characteristics of 
this duration. On the one hand d1), in its lines and colors “the plas-
tic element vibrates as if it retained something of the movement of 
the hand which placed it on the canvas”64 and which the pictorial 
object in turn quickens in the spectator. And on the other hand, 
d2) because the aesthetic object is meaningful and seeks to signify, 
one can speak here—however metaphorically—of a “movement 
toward meaning.”65 
While this last view of temporality (=d2) rests on a particular 
understanding of metaphors, one will fi nd it fairly analogous to 
the situation described by Husserl of images prompting imagi-
native continuations and bringing something to mind. And what 
an image’s movement toward meaning brings to mind is a sub-
ject—though in a different sense from the depicted image subject. 
As Brough puts it “the signifying character simply indicates that 
something is represented in the work, that it has a subject, even if 
the subject is not some defi nite and identifi able person or thing.”66 
This subject or meaning, according to Dufrenne, is inexpressible 
because it rests both in the form and in the content of the concrete 
painting.
Indeed, it is remarkable accomplishment for Dufrenne to place 
the duration internal to the image at two different book ends—on 
the one hand, as the conclusion to the movement in which the 
painting has been engendered, and which it can communicate, and 
on the other hand, as the vehicle for a movement towards a mean-
63. Ibidem.
64. PAE 278/279/PEA I 350. 
65. PAE 381/ PEA I 353.
66. Cf. J. B. BROUGH, Representation, in H. R. SEPP, L. EMBREE (eds.), Handbook of 
Phenomenological Aesthetics (Springer, Dordrecht, 2010) 285.
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ing of unapparent (yet still personal) importance which the image 
prompts in the viewer. 
In going through the different levels of temporality outlined by 
Dufrenne, one can also see that Husserl would be largely in agree-
ment with Dufrenne. For Husserl has also thought of the temporal-
ity of the image subject (=a); the objective time of the image in the 
sense of the real time of the physical image thing (=b); the seeing 
of the painting as a temporally extended process itself (=c); the at-
tentiveness to the way in which the rendering of the image object 
itself gives rise to delight (=d1); and lastly the peculiarity that images 
prompt us to wonder and bring to mind other experiences67 (=d2). 
Husserl in turn contributes to this discussion most profoundly 
by taking us back to his earlier claim that art—including too the 
pictorial arts—does not move exclusively within the confi nements of 
producing intuitions. Just like in the theater the viewer takes some 
of the available materials to perceptually phantasize the drama, so 
also the aesthetically informed viewer takes the sensuous elements 
of the painted canvas as the very texture of the pictorial image 
world. The movement by which the imagination takes anew the 
sensuous contents and sees them play different roles—at one time 
depicting a woman (in Da Vinci’s “Head of a Woman,” c. 1508), at 
another time prompting me to think of her thoughts, at yet another 
time making me wonder what she is looking at, and still at another 
time seeking to fi nd the starting and end points of her wondrously 
loosened hair—all reveal a life in this static image—paradoxically 
‘moving’ under the viewer’s gaze while staying self-same.
67. For further reference on this point see P. CROWTHER, Phenomenologies of Art and 
Vision: A Post-Analytic Turn (Bloomsbury, London, 2013) 138.

